On September 6, 2017, an expanded panel of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board issued an “informative” decision in General Plastic Industrial Co., Ltd, v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha setting forth the Board’s framework for analyzing follow-on inter partes review (IPR) petitions. In response to five concurrent requests for rehearing, a panel of seven administrative patent judges reviewed the factors articulated in NVIDIA Corp. v. Samsung Elec. Co., IPR2016-00134, Paper 9 (PTAB May 4, 2016) and, in doing so, denied all five requests. While acknowledging that multiple petitions challenging the same patent may be permitted based on specific facts of each case, the Board explained that follow-on petitions run the risk of undue inequities and prejudices to patent owners, and petitioner’s submission of multiple, staggered petitions constituted “an inefficient use of the inter partes review process and the Board’s resources.”
Brad Scheller a Member in the firm’s New York office and focuses his practice on patent disputes in Federal District Courts and at the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. He has handled disputes involving a variety of technologies, including electrical components, electronic payment and financial systems, computer software, and various consumer products, including cosmetics, video game systems and personal watercraft. Brad also has significant experience representing clients in inter partes reviews and covered business method patent review proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board of the US Patent and Trademark Office.
The Federal Circuit yesterday issued an opinion in In re: Smith Int’l, Inc., No. 2016-2303 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 26, 2017) reversing an affirmance by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board of the rejection of several claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,732,817 being challenged in ex parte reexamination. In so doing, the Court held the Board’s construction of “body” in the ’817 Patent claims to be unreasonable as inconsistent with the specification.
The ’817 Patent concerns a downhole drilling tool for oil and gas operations. In affirming the examiner, the Board found it “perfectly reasonable” to interpret the “body” of the tool as encompassing other components because neither the claims nor the specification explicitly limit the scope of the term. Even though the specification describes the body as separate from other elements, the Board reasoned that it doesn’t expressly define “body” or otherwise preclude the examiner’s interpretation. But according to Smith, the ’817 Patent consistently refers to and depicts the body as a component distinct from other components of the drilling tool – like the “mandrel” or “piston” located inside the drilling tool – and should be interpreted simply as an “outer housing.”
On August 25, 2017, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board issued a precedential opinion in Ex Parte McAward, reaffirming the Patent Office’s use of a lower pre-issuance threshold for indefiniteness distinct from the Supreme Court’s Nautilus standard.
A Tale of Two Standards
Under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b), the specification must conclude with “one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter” regarded as the invention. This definiteness requirement “secure[s] to the patentee all to which he is entitled” and “apprise[s] the public of what is still open to them.” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996).
During examination, the Patent Office applies the broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim and thereafter determines indefiniteness using the In re Packard standard, in which a claim is indefinite when it contains words or phrases whose meaning is unclear. See In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2014)(per curium).
Last week, the Federal Circuit held computer memory system patent claims not abstract and thus patent-eligible under Section 101, reversing a lower court dismissal of the case under Rule 12(b)(6). Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., No. 2016-2254, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 15187 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 15, 2017).
U.S. Patent No. 5,953,740 (“the ‘740 patent”) describes a memory system that can be tailored for use with multiple different processors without reducing performance. Id. at 3. The ‘740 patent explains that when “the [memory] system is turned on, information about the type of processor is used to self-configure the programmable operational characteristics.” Visual Memory, No. 2016-2254, slip op. at 4. “For example, depending on the type of processor, internal cache 16 can store both code and noncode data, or it can store only code data.” Id. at 4. Claim 1 recites the following:
The Supreme Court’s decision five months ago in TC Heartland v. Kraft Food Group Brands was a sea change in the way courts interpret venue for patent infringement cases. Since the Federal Circuit’s decision in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990), venue in patent infringement cases has been determined using 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), which equates a corporate defendant’s residence with personal jurisdiction. In TC Heartland, the Supreme Court effectively abrogated VE Holding by finding that a corporate defendant “resides” only in its State of incorporation for venue purposes.
The U.S. Supreme Court announced its ruling in TC Heartland v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC on May 22, 2017, a patent infringement case that has garnered national attention for its implications on venue. This case originated with a motion to transfer an action filed in the District of Delaware to the Southern District of Indiana, where the Defendant accused of patent infringement is headquartered. However, the national attention has focused on the possibility that a significant amount of other patent litigation may now shift to the District of Delaware. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari at the end of last year and heard oral arguments in March to address the question of “where proper venue lies for a patent infringement lawsuit brought against a domestic corporation.” The Court has now provided a response to this key question, although a few issues still remain.
Last week the Federal Circuit in Helsinn Healthcare v. Teva Pharmaceuticals clarified the scope of the on-sale bar rule under the America Invents Act (AIA). The on-sale bar in general means that a sale or an offer to sale of an invention more than one year prior to the effective filing date of a patent qualifies as prior art. The Federal Circuit held that 35 U.S.C. § 102 as revised in the AIA does not change the long-settled rule that a sale can invalidate an invention even if the sale does not disclose the details of the invention.
The Federal Circuit has now reversed the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s decision in Synopsys, Inc. v. ATopTech, Inc. finding claims 1 and 32 of U.S. Patent No. 6,567,967 (the “‘967 patent”) as being “not supported by substantial evidence.”
Synopsys sued ATopTech in 2013 for allegedly infringing the ‘967 patent. ATopTech subsequently filed two inter partes review (IPR) petitions (IPR2014-01150 and IPR2014-01159) challenging the validity of all claims of the ‘967 patent. The ‘967 patent aims to improve circuit performance by splitting large components into small subcomponents and optimizing the connections between subcomponents. Claim 1 requires “flattening each of said plurality of hierarchically arranged branches by eliminating superfluous levels of hierarchy above said atomic blocks.” Claim 32 requires “determining optimal placement of each of the hard blocks, if any, within the predefined area.” The Board found both claims either obviousness or anticipated in view of the Fields and/or Su references.
Today, the Federal Circuit, vacated-in-part and remanded the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s obviousness determination regarding a Securus Technologies patent directed to systems and methods for reviewing conversation data for certain events and bookmarking portions of the recording when something of interest is said, finding that the Board failed to provide any explanation for its decision with respect to certain challenged claims.
On April 6, 2017, the Federal Circuit reversed-in-part and affirmed-in-part the district court’s judgment of infringement and summary judgment for non-infringement of The Medicines Company’s (“MedCo”) patents-in-suit. See The Medicines Company v. Mylan, Inc., 2015-1113 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The patents-in-suit were U.S. Patent Nos. 7,582,727 (“the ’727 Patent) and 7,598,343 (“the ’343 Patent”). MedCo initiated a suit against Mylan, Inc. (“Mylan”) in response to Mylan submitting an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”). Through submitting an ANDA request, Mylan wished to obtain approval from the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) for a generic drug that would directly compete against MedCo’s ANGIOMAX® product. To counter Mylan’s ANDA request, and keep their product exclusive, MedCo filed suit alleging that Mylan’s ANDA drug infringed claims in both the ’727 and ’343 Patents.
The district court held on summary judgment that Mylan’s drug did not satisfy the “efficient mixing” limitation of the ’343 Patent; however, following a 6-day bench trial found that Mylan’s drug did infringe the ’727 Patent because the asserted claims did not include an “efficient mixing” limitation. Mylan argued on appeal that the district court erred by not including the “efficient mixing” limitation as part of the “batches” limitation in the ’727 Patent.