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Michael Renaud is the Division Head of our Intellectual Property Practice and serves on the firm’s Policy Committee. He is an experienced litigator known for his business approach to creating value in patent assets. His success on behalf of clients comes from his ability to identify the value drivers in a portfolio and communicate that value to competitors, investors, purchasers, licensees, counsel, judges, and juries. With a background in mechanical engineering and nearly 20 years of experience practicing law, he has the combination of technical and legal skills essential to a strategic patent practice.

The public version of ALJ Shaw’s Initial Determination (ID) in U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) investigation Certain Magnetic Data Storage Tapes and Cartridges Containing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-1012 (1012 Investigation), provides important guidance on enforcement of standard-essential patents (SEPs) in the ITC.  Respondent and accused infringer Sony argued that several of the patents asserted by patentee Fujifilm wereessential to the LTO-7 standard (relating to “linear tape open” magnetic media) and therefore that Fujifilm had waived its right to injunctive relief and was obligated to license its patents on FRAND terms.  ALJ Shaw ultimately found that Sony had not met its burden of demonstrating essentiality, but he nevertheless provided helpful instructions on the quantum of proof necessary to make out such a claim, as well as other factors relevant to ITC enforcement of SEPs, all of which affirmed that the ITC is a viable forum for enforcement of SEPs.  In sum he ruled that:

  • The party arguing that a patent is essential bears the burden of proof on that point;
  • Unless a patent is, in fact, essential to a given standard, there can be no breach of the standard-setting organization (SSO) agreement(s) giving rise to the FRAND obligation at issue;
  • Breach of an SSO agreement and of forum selection clauses are not valid defenses in ITC investigations; and
  • Respondents bear the burden of proving that a complainant/patentee relinquished its rights to equitable relief by joining the SSO in question.

Continue Reading ALJ Shaw: ITC is a Viable Forum for Enforcement of SEPs

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Aqua Products Inc., v. Matal materially changes the burden of proof associated with the patentability of amended claims during an inter partes review (“IPR”), shifting the burden from the Patent Owner seeking the amendment to the IPR Petitioner opposing it.

Prior to the Aqua decision, if a Patent Owner sought to amend claims during an IPR, the Patent Trial and Appeals Board (the “Board”) placed the burden on the Patent Owner to prove that the proposed amended claims were patentable.  When Patent Owner Aqua attempted to amend its claims during an IPR challenge to its U.S. Patent No. 8,273,183, the Board found that Aqua had not met its burden and denied Aqua’s motion to amend.

Continue Reading AQUA PRODUCTS: The Federal Circuit Shifts The Burden of Proof On Amending Claims During An IPR From The Patent Owner To The Petitioner

The Defend Trade Secrets Acts (DTSA) provides an important tool for any company possessing trade secrets to bring a suit in federal court to remedy and prevent dissemination of a misappropriated trade secret. Specifically, under 18 U.S.C. § 1836, the DTSA creates a federal private civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation in which “[a]n owner of a trade secret that is misappropriated may bring a civil action . . . if the trade secret is related to a product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.” But what about conspiracy to commit trade secret misappropriation – can a private party bring a civil action for conspiracy to commit trade secret misappropriation under 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)? The Eastern District of Virginia in Steves and Sons, Inc. v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., CA No. 3:16-cv-545 (E.D. Va.) recently addressed this novel question, and found that the answer is “no.” Continue Reading DTSA Does Not Create a Private Civil Cause of Action for Conspiracy to Commit Trade Secret Theft

Last week, the Federal Circuit held computer memory system patent claims not abstract and thus patent-eligible under Section 101, reversing a lower court dismissal of the case under Rule 12(b)(6).  Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., No. 2016-2254, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 15187 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 15, 2017).

U.S. Patent No. 5,953,740 (“the ‘740 patent”) describes a memory system that can be tailored for use with multiple different processors without reducing performance.  Id. at 3.  The ‘740 patent explains that when “the [memory] system is turned on, information about the type of processor is used to self-configure the programmable operational characteristics.”  Visual Memory, No. 2016-2254, slip op. at 4.  “For example, depending on the type of processor, internal cache 16 can store both code and noncode data, or it can store only code data.”  Id. at 4.  Claim 1 recites the following:

Continue Reading In a Reversal, Federal Circuit Finds Data Processing Claims Patent-Eligible Under Section 101 in Visual Memory v. NVIDIA

The Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) Ex Parte Seizure mechanism allows victims of trade secret misappropriation to quickly prevent further dissemination of confidential information by asking a court to direct federal marshals to seize stolen trade secret material and secure that material during the pendency of a formal DTSA case. The DTSA directs that civil seizure only be used in “extraordinary circumstances,” however, and courts entertaining requests for civil seizure have hewed closely to this directive. See, e.g., OOO Brunswick Rail Mgt. v. Sultanov, Case No. 5:17-cv-00017 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2017) (denying request for civil seizure and instead ordering preservation of devices at issue pursuant to Rule 65); Magnesita Refractories Co. v. Mishra, 2:16-cv-524 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 25, 2017) (same); Dazzle Software II, LLC v. Kinney, Case No. 1:16-cv-12191 (E.D. Mich. July 18, 2016) (denying request for civil seizure where court not convinced that defendant would not comply with order under Rule 65); Balearia Caribbean Ltd. Corp. v. Calvo, Case No. 1:16-cv-23300 (S.D. Fla. Aug 5, 2016) (“a plaintiff may not rely on bare assertions that the defendant, if given notice, would destroy relevant evidence”).

In what appears to be the first civil seizure order under the DTSA, in Mission Capital Advisors LLC v. Romaka, No. 16-cv-5878 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016), the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ordered federal marshals to seize contact lists and other electronically-stored information that was allegedly misappropriated by Defendant, a former employee of Plaintiff. The circumstances of this case provide insight into what “extraordinary circumstances” are necessary for a district court to order civil seizure under the DTSA. Continue Reading DTSA and Ex Parte Seizure – Lessons from the First Ex Parte Seizure Under The DTSA

In a first of its kind decision with important ramifications for patentees, the U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC”) denied a petition to suspend or temporarily rescind remedial orders issued in Investigation No. 337-TA-945 pending appeal of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (“PTAB”) separate finding that the patent claims at issue are invalid.  The ITC has therefore decided to continue to exclude products it found to be infringing certain patents, regardless of the PTAB invalidating the very patents the exclusion order is based upon in separate IPR proceedings.  While this decision aiding patentees may surprise some, it is consistent with the ITC’s practices regarding stays and of giving little deference to IPR proceedings.

Continue Reading ITC Denies Suspension or Temporary Rescission of Remedial Orders After PTAB Invalidates Patents at Issue

In a move that could drastically change the patent law landscape, the United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Oil States Energy Services LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group LLC, No. 16-712, to answer the question whether the inter partes review (IPR) process violates the U.S. Constitution by “extinguishing private property rights through a non-Article III forum without a jury.”

In 2001, Oil States Energy Services LLC (“Oil States”) was granted U.S. Patent No. 6,179,053 for a lockdown mechanism to ensure a mandrel is locked in an operative position during fracking.  Oil States sued Greene’s Energy Group LLC (“Greene’s Energy”) in the Eastern District of Texas in 2012 for infringing this patent, and in turn, Greene’s Energy petitioned the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to institute an IPR on the patent.  This petition was granted. After the proceedings, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), the administrative body of the USPTO that handles IPRs, concluded the challenged patent claims were invalid.  Oil States appealed to the Federal Circuit, which affirmed the decision, and Oil States then petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari.

Continue Reading Supreme Court to Decide the Constitutionality of Inter Partes Review

shutterstock_402862363A recent decision in the Northern District of Illinois gave life to the inevitable disclosure doctrine under the Defend Trade Secrets Act. Inevitable disclosure is a common law doctrine by which a court can prevent a former employee from working for a competitor of his or her former employer where doing so would require the employee to depend upon his or her former employer’s trade secret information. See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995). To date, some commentators have suggested that the inevitable disclosure doctrine is not available under the DTSA because of language in the statute indicating that any injunction granted under the statute to prevent trade secret misappropriation may not “prevent a person from entering into an employment relationship,” and that any conditions placed on employment must be based on “evidence of threatened misappropriation and not merely on the information the person knows.”   The Northern District of Illinois’s decision in Molon Motor and Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No. 16 C 03545 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017), however, suggests that the inevitable disclosure doctrine may continue to be useful for trade secret plaintiffs asserting claims under the DTSA.

Continue Reading The DTSA and Inevitable Disclosure

shutterstock_219589294A recent decision in the Western District of Kentucky highlights the importance of explaining in a complaint under the Defend Trade Secrets Act why the allegedly misappropriated information qualifies for trade secret protection. The decision is an important reminder that it is not enough to simply call something a “trade secret” in a complaint under the DTSA. Rather, a plaintiff must plausibly allege how the information qualifies as a trade secret. Where a plaintiff fails to do so, the complaint is susceptible to dismissal with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Continue Reading Failure to Explain Why Misappropriated Information is a Trade Secret May Lead to Dismissal of a DTSA Complaint With Prejudice

keyboard_566705419In recent years, software patents have come under fire from legislation (the American Invents Act) that has generally made patents easier to invalidate, and from court decisions (the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice v. CLS Bank and its progeny) that have made computer-implemented inventions more vulnerable to subject matter eligibility challenges. Some observers have concluded that software patents are no longer worth pursuing. We disagree. Although there are real challenges, and patents on some software or other computer-implemented inventions may now be quite difficult (or even impossible) to obtain or enforce, a well-written and well-prosecuted patent application can circumvent many of these obstacles.

To read our full advisory on software patent eligibility, please click here.