On Monday, January 9, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court denied, without comment, Mylan Pharmaceuticals’ petition for certiorari to reverse an opinion by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which affirmed a broad scope of personal jurisdiction over generic ANDA filers in patent infringement suits under the Hatch-Waxman Act.
On Friday, March 18, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed two District of Delaware rulings that non-resident defendant generic ANDA filer, Mylan, is subject to personal jurisdiction in two Hatch-Waxman suits filed in the state. (See Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., No. 14‐935‐LPS (D. Del. Jan. 14, 2015); AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., No. 14‐696‐GMS (D. Del. Nov. 5, 2014). For coverage of the oral argument in these appeals, see our prior blog post.) The Federal Circuit found that specific personal jurisdiction exists over Mylan in Delaware because Mylan’s ANDA filings reliably indicate its intent to engage in actions that will harm plaintiffs’ patent rights in the jurisdiction. The court did not reach the issue on appeal of whether Mylan’s compliance with Delaware’s registration statute established consent to general personal jurisdiction in the state, an issue on which the lower court opinions split. However, Judge Kathleen M. O’Malley, concurring in the majority’s judgement, would also have found Mylan consented to general personal jurisdiction in light of Delaware’s interpretation of its registration statute.
Filing an ANDA Satisfies the Minimum Contacts Requirement of Specific Personal Jurisdiction
The court held that “the particular actions Mylan has already taken–its ANDA filings–for the purpose of engaging in that injury-causing and allegedly wrongful marketing conduct in Delaware” satisfy the minimum contacts with Delaware required to establish specific personal jurisdiction. The court began by observing that, if Mylan had already begun the generic drug marketing activities for which it seeks permission by filing an ANDA, “there is no doubt that it could be sued for infringement in Delaware,” and elsewhere that it seeks to market the generic ANDA products. Mylan’s ANDA filings, in turn, are “formal acts that reliably indicate plans to engage in” that same infringing activity. Thus, the ANDA filings, like the contemplated marketing acts they seek approval for, establish personal jurisdiction over Mylan in Delaware.
On Monday, January 4, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit heard oral argument in two appeals that may determine what effect the Supreme Court’s Daimler AG v. Bauman decision will have on the exercise of personal jurisdiction over generic pharmaceutical manufacturers in Hatch-Waxman litigation.
Decisions Below Denying Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
Generic ANDA filer Mylan appealed from denial of its motion to dismiss in AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., No. 14‐696‐GMS (D. Del. Nov. 5, 2014). Judge Gregory M. Sleet found specific personal jurisdiction over the foreign corporate defendant in Delaware based on Mylan’s sending a Paragraph IV notice letter to AstraZeneca in Delaware. Judge Sleet also found, citing the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (U.S. 2014), that Mylan’s registration to do business in Delaware did not constitute consent to personal jurisdiction, and thus general personal jurisdiction, in Delaware.
On Monday Mylan also argued its appeal of the denial of a similar motion to dismiss in Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., No. 14‐935‐LPS (D. Del. Jan. 14, 2015). In that case, Chief Judge Leonard P. Stark found specific personal jurisdiction exists over Mylan in Delaware based on Mylan’s sending a Paragraph IV notice letter to the Delaware-incorporated Acorda, even though the notice letter was not mailed to Delaware. Judge Stark, unlike Judge Sleet, also found general personal jurisdiction over Mylan because Mylan consented to personal jurisdiction in the state by voluntarily registering to do business there.
On May 22, 2015, in a much-watched case, the Second Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction against Actavis PLC and its wholly owned subsidiary, Forest Laboratories, LLC (collectively “Actavis” or “Forest”), finding that Actavis’s “hard switch” strategy to launch an extended-release version of its blockbuster Alzheimer’s therapy and delist the immediate-release version would likely violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Court held that because generic competition depends heavily on state drug substitution laws that allow pharmacists to substitute generics for branded products, the combination of launch and product removal constituted an anticompetitive “product hop” that would likely impede generic competition on the merits for the original immediate-release version of the drug. For more details on the decision, take a look here, where we share analysis on the opinion.