In June, we covered the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 2239 (2017). The Court will decide whether inter partes review – an adversarial process used by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) since September 16, 2012 to analyze the validity of existing patents – violates the Constitution by extinguishing private property rights through a non-Article III forum without a jury. With its remarkably high rate of invalidating challenged patents, inter partes review (IPR) has become an effective method for defendants in patent disputes to apply pressure on patent holders, often utilizing serial IPRs to take multiple shots at invalidating patents they infringe. With the potential for IPRs to be declared unconstitutional, some parties have asked courts to stay active litigation until after Oil States is decided. One court in the Northern District of Texas recently denied such a motion to stay in Leak Surveys, Inc. v. FLIR Systems, Inc., 3-13-cv-02897 (TXND 2017-11-13, Order) (Lynn, USDJ). Continue Reading District Court Denies Motion to Stay Pending Supreme Court Decision in Oil States
In a nonprecedential opinion issued on November 13, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court finding that Apotex’s aBLAs for biosimilar versions of Neulasta® and Neupogen® did not infringe an Amgen protein folding patent. The Federal Circuit affirmed the non-infringement finding despite statements made in Apotex’s pre-litigation letters sent during the parties’ information exchange (i.e., the “patent dance”), which the district court found were controverted by evidence presented by Apotex at trial.
Amgen makes the biologic drugs Neulasta® (pegfilgrastim) and Neupogen® (filgrastim). Apotex submitted aBLAs (“abbreviated Biologics License Applications”) to the FDA seeking approval of biosimilar versions of both drugs under the BPCIA (“Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act”) framework. The parties engaged in the BPCIA’s “patent dance” information exchange process, whereby Apotex provided Amgen with copies of Apotex’s aBLAs. Amgen ultimately brought suit under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(C), (a) and (g), asserting that Apotex’s proposed manufacturing processes would infringe, among others, Amgen’s U.S. Patent. No. 8,952,138 (the ‘138 patent).
The ‘138 patent covers a method of refolding misfolded proteins. This process purportedly allows for large-scale protein refolding using lower reagent volumes than was previously possible. The district court construed (and the Federal Circuit did not reverse) asserted claim 1 of the ‘138 patent to require “refold mixture” protein concentrations above 1.0 g/L. Continue Reading Federal Circuit Evaluates Import of Factual Statements Made During BPCIA Pre-litigation Patent Dance
On November 15, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit resolved a split among district courts on the question whether the United States Supreme Court’s TC Heartland decision constituted a change in the law, or merely a course-correction to honor preexisting law. The Federal Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s decision changed the controlling law. In re: Micron, No. 17-00138 at 13 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 15, 2017).
Micron Technology, Inc. asked the Federal Circuit to set aside the district court’s denial of its motion to dismiss or transfer the case for improper venue. The district court held that Micron waived its objection to venue because it failed to raise an available venue defense in its initial Rule 12 motion to dismiss, and concluded that TC Heartland was not a change in the law.
The Federal Circuit disagreed. It reasoned that the Supreme Court clearly rejected V.E. Holding and concluded that the definition of “resides” in § 1391(c) does not apply to § 1400(b). The Federal Circuit further reasoned that the Supreme Court changed the law by severing § 1400(b) from § 1391(c). As a result, the objection was not “available” under Rule 12(g)(2) when Defendant filed its motion to dismiss in 2016, before TC Heartland came down. On this basis, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the case. This decision resolves a previously open question in the wake of TC Heartland that we wrote about here.
In issuing its precedential decision earlier this month in Two-Way Media v. Comcast, the Federal Circuit affirmed a Delaware district court determination that four data streaming patents were directed to ineligible subject matter pursuant to § 101 and the Alice framework. The four related patents (U.S. Patent Nos. 5,778,187, 5,983,005, 6,434,622, and 7,266,686) describe methods and systems for streaming audio/visual data over a communications system (e.g., the Internet) and, in particular, a scalable architecture for delivering real-time information to a number of users, including a control mechanism allowing for management and administration of users intended to receive the real-time information.
Under Alice step one, the Court found that the patents claimed the abstract idea of sending and monitoring the delivery of audio/visual information. The Federal Circuit agreed with this characterization of the claims, finding that the claims used results-based functional language with no articulation of how the particular results are achieved. Two-Way Media also proposed claim constructions that it argued tied the claims to a scalable network architecture. Even after adopting Two-Way Media’s propose constructions, both the District Court and the Federal Circuit found that the constructions, at best, encompassed using generic computer components to carry out the abstract idea and still failed to indicate how the claims themselves “are directed to a scalable network architecture that itself leads to an improvement in the functioning of the system.” (emphasis added) Continue Reading Federal Circuit Affirms Delaware Alice Decision
In an interesting development in the post-TC Heartland world, it appears that the Federal Circuit will soon answer the question whether the Supreme Court’s venue decision was a change in the law, or merely a course-correction to honor preexisting law. Here, in a case arising out of the Eastern District of New York, the Federal Circuit ordered AlmondNet, Inc., Datonics, LLC, and Intent IQ, LLC to respond to a petition for a writ of mandamus submitted by Yahoo Holdings, Inc. In its petition, Yahoo argued that the District Court erred in denying its motion to transfer, and specifically that it waived the right to challenge venue on the basis that TC Heartland did not change the law of venue.
In Vecco Instruments Inc. v. SGL Carbon, LLC, No. 17-CV-2217 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2017), Judge Pamela Chen in the Eastern District of New York recently granted Vecco’s motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining SGL Carbon. The requested injunction sought to prevent SGL Carbon’s further actions related to its likely indirect infringement of Vecco’s asserted patents. Notable in this extensive and detailed 76-page decision is the Court’s discussion of how “long-term and second-order” effects of the accused infringer’s actions can satisfy the “irreparable harm” requirement of the preliminary injunction analysis.
Plaintiff Vecco designs, manufactures, and services LEDs, power electronics, hard drives, and other electronic devices. It also owns patents related to metal-organic chemical vapor deposition (MOCVD) reactors, a technology that enables high-volume fabrication of metal-organic semiconductor wafers that can be turned into LEDs. Vecco enjoys a large share of the MOCVD market due, in large part, to a distinctive feature of its MOCVD reactors: a removable wafer carrier, typically made of graphite that is mounted on a spindle centrally positioned within the reactor. Vecco authorized SGL Carbon to manufacture these wafer carriers for Vecco and its customers, but in 2013, SGL Carbon began manufacturing wafer carrier for a new entrant into the MOCVD market. Vecco claims this constituted infringement of its MOCVD patents, and sought a preliminary injunction to stop this activity during the pendency of the patent litigation case.
Following a lengthy and extensive litigation that began in 2011 that culminated in a U.S. Supreme Court decision in December of 2016, smartphone industry titans Apple and Samsung will again find themselves in Federal District Court Judge Lucy Koh’s courtroom on remand to determine appropriate damages for Samsung’s infringement of Apple’s design patents.
US Design Pat. No. 593,087
US Design Pat. No. 604,305
US Design Pat. No. 618,677
As we have written before, Apple originally filed this patent infringement action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in 2011, alleging that, in relevant part, Samsung’s smartphones infringed three of Apple’s design patents. Judge Koh presided over the dispute. The jury found infringement of all three design patents, and the district court entered final judgment awarding $399 million attributable to Samsung’s infringement of the design patents. The Federal Circuit upheld the lower court’s judgment on the amount of damages for infringement of the design patents, and Samsung filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court seeking reversal.
Late last week, the Federal Circuit granted a writ of mandamus in In re Cray, 2017-129 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 21, 2017), overturning Judge Gilstrap’s four-factor test for determining whether a defendant possesses “a regular and established place of business” in a district such that the defendant could be sued for patent infringement in that district. In re Cray provides useful guidance because it is the first time since the Supreme Court’s TC Heartland decision that the Federal Circuit has weighed in on what constitutes a “regular and established place of business.” The patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), provides that venue is proper in a patent infringement lawsuit only where the defendant (1) resides or (2) has “committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.” TC Heartland clarified that a defendant “resides” only in the state in which it is incorporated. It did not address the second prong, however, which is an alternative way of establishing venue. More frequently patent owners are looking to the second prong to determine the locus of an appropriate venue now that the first prong of the statute has been interpreted narrowly.
The decision in U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) investigation Certain Magnetic Data Storage Tapes and Cartridges Containing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-1012 (“1012 Investigation”), is still confidential, but the ITC has issued a notice stating that ALJ Shaw has ruled in favor of patentee Fujifilm against Sony and recommended that an exclusion order be issued. This is important because it is the first time the ITC has issued an exclusion order on standard-essential patents (SEPs), and may be the first time any U.S. tribunal has issued exclusionary or injunctive relief on patents which were declared standard essential. In the opinion, which should become public in a few weeks, ALJ Shaw, who presided over the case, is expected to address a number of key issues relating to the assertion of SEPs in general, and at the ITC specifically. In this case many of Sony’s affirmative defenses relate to the alleged essentiality of the asserted patents and the Administrative Law Judge was asked to answer a number of questions relating to SEPs generally and the ability to enforce them at the ITC.
The Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) Ex Parte Seizure mechanism allows victims of trade secret misappropriation to quickly prevent further dissemination of confidential information by asking a court to direct federal marshals to seize stolen trade secret material and secure that material during the pendency of a formal DTSA case. The DTSA directs that civil seizure only be used in “extraordinary circumstances,” however, and courts entertaining requests for civil seizure have hewed closely to this directive. See, e.g., OOO Brunswick Rail Mgt. v. Sultanov, Case No. 5:17-cv-00017 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2017) (denying request for civil seizure and instead ordering preservation of devices at issue pursuant to Rule 65); Magnesita Refractories Co. v. Mishra, 2:16-cv-524 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 25, 2017) (same); Dazzle Software II, LLC v. Kinney, Case No. 1:16-cv-12191 (E.D. Mich. July 18, 2016) (denying request for civil seizure where court not convinced that defendant would not comply with order under Rule 65); Balearia Caribbean Ltd. Corp. v. Calvo, Case No. 1:16-cv-23300 (S.D. Fla. Aug 5, 2016) (“a plaintiff may not rely on bare assertions that the defendant, if given notice, would destroy relevant evidence”).
In what appears to be the first civil seizure order under the DTSA, in Mission Capital Advisors LLC v. Romaka, No. 16-cv-5878 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016), the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ordered federal marshals to seize contact lists and other electronically-stored information that was allegedly misappropriated by Defendant, a former employee of Plaintiff. The circumstances of this case provide insight into what “extraordinary circumstances” are necessary for a district court to order civil seizure under the DTSA. Continue Reading DTSA and Ex Parte Seizure – Lessons from the First Ex Parte Seizure Under The DTSA